Analysis of the remaining game model of transaction cost of vertical industrial cluster

Analysis of the remaining game model of transaction cost of vertical industrial cluster


Author:Jin Chunyu Journal:Jianghan Tribune  Date:2008(3)

Keywords Industrial cluster; spillover effect; transaction cost repetitive game;

Abstract

Based on the model of the overall decomposition of the industrial cluster, this paper analyzes the way of vertical industry cluster to avoid the "opportunism" behavior of the transaction subject by reducing the game, reduce the endogenous transaction cost, and obtain the way of the cost surplus effect. Based on the upstream and downstream enterprises The behavior of the monitoring behavior in the transaction and the "opportunistic" game model design, analysis of the vertical industry cluster monitoring cost savings spillover effect mechanism. The results show that industrial clusters, as a sub-system of regional economic system, have new functions which are not part of their components. The relationship between the upstream and downstream enterprises can reduce the transaction cost by repeating the game and the reputation mechanism within the cluster. Transaction risk, in order to achieve industrial cluster cost savings spillover effect.


Views[ Share: Weibo WeChat Q-zone