A Model Analysis of Solving the Risk of Socialized Principal - agent in Army Logistics Support

A Model Analysis of Solving the Risk of Socialized Principal - agent in Army Logistics Support


Author:Jin Chunyu,Liu Jinquan Journal:Study & Exploration  Date:2006(5)

Keywords Principal - agent risk; dynamic game model; logistics socialization;

Abstract

In the process of social reform of our army logistics, the military side and the local service agencies constitute a game of different interests. In the process of two stages of dynamic game, to avoid the risk of social security entrusted agent, we need to establish and improve the legal monitoring system and legal restraint mechanism, implement effective legal monitoring, strengthen the internal control of the local service agencies; In the course of the game, the strategy of avoiding "opportunism" behavior of local service enterprises should be reasonable control of the number of single transactions, moderate increase in the number of transactions, through repeated games to make local service enterprises more based on future earnings considerations, change its The tendency of "opportunism".


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