Extendable Capital and the Game of Power

Extendable Capital and the Game of Power


Author:Zhang Yishan,Wang Guangliang Journal:China Industrial Economics  Date:2004(7)

Keywords Extendable Capital;Manpower Capital;Game of Power

Abstract

In capitalist initial stage,the capital is regarded as the mean s to exploit workers, while investors have to take measure to prevent managers from occupying enterprise’s benefit in modern company. The purpose of this paper is to find the essence of that phenomenon that investor’s income takes a turn for the worse. An enterprise is the economic organization made up through the agreement of manpower capital and material capital in theory. Its property right structure is the result of game between man power capital an d money capita1. With the rising of the power of the manpower capital in enterprises,its position and income must be improved thereupon.In fact.there is not an objective standard to divide the contribution and revenue of the two at all, and the decline of Investor’s status does not mean the reducing of his income. To emphasize interests of shareholder too much not only consume unnecessary cost to adjust so-called “reasonable”distribution, but also twist the distribution structure that is probably to maximize enterprise’s income.

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