Abstract: This paper calculates the evolution stability strategy for coordination supply of rural inclusive finance by the government and rural financial institutions. Based on the panel data of 30 regions, we use the SBM and super efficient SBM models to measure supply coordination efficiency between them, and use the Tobit model to decompose the impact of input variables by the government and rural financial institutions on the coordination efficiency. The findings show that (1) the decisive role of the government in the implementation of rural inclusive finance makes it possible for the government to consider its own costs and benefits, while the decision-making of rural financial institutions is largely influenced by that of the government; (2) on the whole, coordination supply efficiency of rural inclusive finance in China has been rising year by year, and the eastern and more developed central regions show higher efficiency while western and less developed central regions show lower one; (3) rural infrastructure investment and the number of financial institutions have inverted U-shaped and positive U-shaped relationship with coordination efficiency respectively, and the current input of these two factors is insufficient; (4) agricultural loan subsides, the number of employees in financial institutions and per capita agricultural loan have positive effects on coordination efficiency, while negative effects on financial risk hedging mechanism and agricultural insurance indemnity rate.

Keywords: rural inclusive finance; coordination supply; evolutionary game; efficiency measurement; supply-side reform