Abstract：Capital market volatility is one of the most common “gray rhino” hidden dangers in financial markets, and the unilateral external governance is proved to have obvious disadvantages. Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2017 as research samples, this paper explores the interaction between the interactive platform of direct information channels and indirect information media analysts on the dual risk of stock price collapse and information misreporting. The results show that the interaction of direct information intensity and indirect information intensity not only inhibits the risk of misreporting of information in advance but also reduces the risk of stock price collapse afterwards. The heterogeneity at the analyst level showed that the above effect only existed in the group with higher star analyst reports and correlation analyst reports. The heterogeneity at the level of interactive platform indicates that the above effect only exists in the group with higher quality of management problem response.

Keyword：capital market; risk government; stock price collapse; information misreporting; information intensity; information quality; analyst characteristics;