Abstract：Financial restatement at the source of misstatement harms the interests of investors, and the objective of external supervision should be to reduce managers' speculative behavior of misreporting in advance and improve the behavior of financial restatement after misreporting occurs. However, a large number of previous literatures equate financial misreporting with financial restatement. So, based on the fraud triangle theory and agency theory, this paper explores the intertemporal regulatory role of analysts' attention by distinguishing between financial misreporting and restatement. Taking the A-share non-financial enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples from 2010 to 2016, a series of robust results show that: the attention of analysts effectively reduces the probability of financial misreporting, which is manifested as “Shock in advance”. And media reports have reinforced analysts' attention about pre-emptive deterrence. At the same time, analysts' attention significantly increases the probability of financial restatement, which is manifested as “correction after the event”. What's more, we use the exogenous shock of brokerage merger to implement DID method for ensuring the robustness of the results. The mechanism study finds that the analyst attention reduces the financial misreporting by attracting investors' attention. Further research finds that the higher the quality of the external analyst reports, the higher the sensitivity of the manager to stock price, and the more significant the effect of the analyst reports on the inhibition of misreporting. In addition, analysts have a greater deterrent effect on major financial misreporting in advance, and a stronger corrective effect on general financial restatement later. The results suggest that analysts' ability to attract attention and expertise enables them to “shock in advance” and “correction after the event” on the quality of corporate disclosure. The contributions of this paper are as follows. On the one hand, we expand the research of the external governance role of analysts by studying the intertemporal supervision of financial misreporting and restatement. On the other hand, by distinguishing financial misreporting from restatement, this paper deepens the related research in the field of information disclosure quality.

Keyword：Financial Misreporting; Financial Restatement; Analyst Attention; Intertemporal Regulation;