Abstract：This paper investigates the identification and correction of the stock price crash risk from the perspective of the exchange, an important regulator of the capital market, namely the risk management logic of the exchange's flexible supervision, against the backdrop of China's high risk-prone period and emphasis on regulatory inclusiveness. The results show that the higher the stock price crash risk, the higher the likelihood of the exchange issuing the annual report inquiry letter, the more times of enquiry, the more third-party intermediary agencies are required to issue verification opinions, and the higher the probability of enterprises responding late, indicating that the exchange can accurately identify the risks accumulated by enterprises from the annual report. Furthermore, as compared to low-risk firms, the exchange's annual report enquiry letter has a considerable impact on media coverage, investor attention, executive compensation, audit efforts, and stock price pricing efficiency of high-risk enterprises, demonstrating that it serves as a post-flexible correction by market forces. The mechanism analysis shows that with the increase of investors' information demand, the stock price crash risk is more easily identified by the exchange's annual inquiry letters, indicating that the information interactive platform provided by the exchange is an important way to influence the regulator's risk identification. Therefore, it is proposed that other flexible supervision methods should be actively explored, combined with traditional punitive supervision, to realize the integration and complementation of various supervision methods, and to play a role in collaborative governance.

Keyword：stock price crash risk; flexible regulation; annual report enquiry letters; risk identification; risk governance; investor information demand;