Abstract: The root cause of corporate governance is agency problem arising from delegations. The key point of agent problem is information asymmetric. Based on the theoretical research, as an effective external mechanism on corporate governance, cross-listing is beneficial to information quality. However the special "Fist H after A" cross-listing path which most Chinese companies chose has more complex influence on its corporate governance. We apply earning forecast accuracy to measure the quality of information disclosure. Firstly, we use data of China's "H+A" cross-listed companies from 2008 to 2013 to investigate the effect of Cross-listing Behavior on Corporate Governance. Our results show that even though the information quality of cross-listed companies is superior to which of the non-cross-listed peers, self-selection appears to be the main reason rather than the improvement coming from Cross-listing Behavior. And longitudinal comparative analysis show that information quality declined after those companies listed abroad. Moreover we examine data of companies with "A+H" dual Listing and find that this "A+H" cross-listing path contributes to improving the corporate governance. Hence our results conclude that different cross-listing path results to distinguish impact on corporate governance. Regulatory authorities should pay attention to the fact that the motivation of "H+A" cross-listing behavior is financing other than improvement of corporate governance.

Keyword: Cross-listings; Information Disclosure Quality; Corporate Governance; The Accuracy of Analysts'Forecasts