Politicians' Promotion Pressure and Firm R&D
Politicians' Promotion Pressure and Firm R&D
Author：Dong Zhu,Pan Lingyun Journal：Nankai Economic Studies Date：2020(02)
Abstract
：
Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2014
，
this paper
analyzes the impact of politicians' promotion pressure on the company's research and develop
ment. The research results show that politicians' promotion pressure has inhibited the company's
R&D investment. In addition
，
we also discussed the regulatory role of the official's job expecta
tions
，
and found that the extension of the official's job expectations can weaken the suppression
effect of the promotion pressure on the company's research and development
，
and the adjustment
effect of the job expectation is more obvious in the less market-oriented regions. In the extended
analysis
，
we further examined the role of politicians' promotion pressure in suppressing the
company's research and development
，
and found that the promotion pressure of officials will
weaken the R&D investment of enterprises through short-term investment incentive
mechanism
，
rent-seeking induction mechanism
，
and market competition inhibition mechanism.
This paper not only analyzes the role of politicians' promotion pressures on the quality of eco
nomic growth
，
but also has important implications for improving political governance and pro
moting economic transformation.
Keywords：Politicians' Promotion Pressure；Firm R&D；Expected Ters；Marketization
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